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Abstract
In Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs), the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires
that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as
for cash. In this paper, I use a three-party model (consumers, local monopolistic
merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes, hetero-
geneous card use benets for merchants and network externalities of card-accepting
merchants on cardholders to assess the e¢ ciency and welfare e¤ects of the NSR.
I show that the NSR: (i) promotes retail price e¢ ciency for cardholders, and (ii)
ine¢ ciently reduces card acceptance among merchants. The NSR can enhance so-
cial welfare and improve payment e¢ ciency by shifting output from cash payers to
cardholders. However, if network externalities are su¢ ciently strong, the reduction
of card payment acceptance a¤ects cardholders negatively and, with the exception
of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ under the NSR. This paper also suggests
that the NSR may be an instrument to decrease cash usage, but the social optimal
policy on the NSR may depend on the competitive conditions in each market.
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1 Introduction
Motivation. Payment cards1 have been experiencing fast growth which has
drawn attention to some of the contentious features of this industry such as
the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR).2 The NSR means that a merchant charges at
most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash.3 Electronic
Payment Networks (EPNs) have argued that to gain greater merchant accep-
tance and consumer usage such a rule is necessary. But is this an e¢ cient and
welfare-enhancing rule?
In several countries, the NSR has been under examination by regulatory
and competition authorities, central banks, courts and governments. For exam-
ple, in 2010 the Portuguese Government decided to make the NSR mandatory
by law, claiming consumer protection and that the use of electronic payments
is more e¢ cient than cash, thus should be protected. In the same year, Visa
and MasterCard reached a settlement with the US DOJ allowing merchants to
reward consumers for paying with cards with lower merchant fees associated,
while American Express Co. (AmEx) vowed to ght a Government antitrust
lawsuit (Forden and Eichenbaum, 2010). In 2015, a US District Court judge
sided with the DOJ, ruling that AmExs rules were anticompetitive by not
allowing merchants to promote other cards or o¤er certain discounts (Sidel,
2015). Note, however, that cash discounts have been used in some circum-
stances (Barron et al., 1992). In the UK, in 2013 the Government banned
payment card surcharges by some businesses such as airlines, cinemas and ho-
tels, as a means to protect consumers from paying excessive card transaction
fees (BBC News, 2013). Also, in early 2018, a ban on payment card surcharges
came into e¤ect across the EU (Financial Times, 2018). In other countries,
such as Australia, the NSR has been abolished (Reserve Bank of Australia,
2011). Critics of the NSR have claimed that it ine¢ ciently encourages the use
of more costly forms of payment (e.g. credit cards) over the less costly (e.g.
cash) leading to a Greshams Law of Payments.
Related literature. Formal economic analysis of electronic payment sys-
1The payment cards industry includes credit, debit, and prepaid cards. In this paper, I
will focus on those with rewards programs attached. Examples of rewards comprise cashback
and points which can be exchanged for goods or services. The rewards may also be construed
as the features coupled with card usage such as theft-insurance for goods purchased with
the card, or dispute-resolution protection.
2In 2002, transactions done on electronic payment networks in the US exceeded $1.7
trillion (Schwartz and Vincent, 2006). In 2006, payment cards were used in 47 billion
transactions for a total of $3.1 trillion (Shy and Wang, 2011). In 2008, debit and prepaid
card purchases topped $3.3 trillion (almost a quarter of US GDP). In the UK it is expected
that consumer card usage will rise by 75% from nearly 10 billion payments in 2012 to nearly
17 billion in 2022 (http://www.paymentscouncil.org.uk).
3Although infrequent, there have been cases where card payments were discounted rela-
tively to cash. For example, in Germany during the transition from mark to euro currency,
and in Argentina and Colombia the Governments have been o¤ering VAT discounts to debit
and credit card transactions since 2003.
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tems was initiated by Baxter (1983) with an analysis of the National Bancard
Corporation vs Visa US Inc litigation (Frankel and Shampine, 2006). Since
then the theoretical payment card literature has been growing, especially af-
ter the year 2000, by addressing the issue of how costs of payment cards are
and might be divided among EPNs, merchants and cardholders (Rochet and
Tirole, 2002, 2003, 2006; Cabral, 2006; Wright, 2012).4 This literature has
pointed out that EPNs may charge fees signicantly in excess of their costs to
merchants and provide incentives to cardholders to increase card adoption and
usage. Nonetheless, to a signicant extent, this literature has assumed that
the NSR is in force.
Wright (2003) analyzed the welfare e¤ects of the NSR under two extremes
of merchant competition: monopoly and Bertrand competition. He showed
that if merchants are local monopolists, the NSR prevents them from surcharg-
ing excessively, therefore the NSR may increase social surplus. If merchants
compete à la Bertrand, they pass to consumers the full benets and costs asso-
ciated with the payment instruments. Under the NSR, competitive merchants
accept only cash or only card payments, and prices in the goods market are set
at the respective marginal cost net of benets. Under surcharging, competitive
merchants accept both types of payment and price discriminate. Thus, if mer-
chants compete à la Bertrand, the social surplus does not change regardless
of the NSR. However, Wright (2003) as all other literature, with the exception
of Schwartz and Vincent (2006), considered that the total quantity of goods
purchased is xed regardless of the NSR.
Schwartz and Vincent (2006) investigated the NSR welfare distribution ef-
fects among cash users and cardholders when a merchant is a local monopolist.
The authors allowed for an elastic demand in the goods market, but assumed
that consumers are exogenously divided into two groups: (i) cardholders that
cannot use cash, and (ii) cash users. They concluded that the NSR harms both
cash users and merchants, benets cardholders, and is protable to the EPN.
However, their model assumes a single merchant and therefore does not take
into account the NSR impact on the network size of card-accepting merchants.
Description of the paper. The analysis in this paper is based on a three-
party model with consumers, merchants and an EPN.5 The model di¤ers from
the existing literature at least in two main aspects. First, it considers si-
multaneously elastic demands in the acceptance of card payments, and goods
market. This allows us to study the NSR e¤ects on merchant acceptance and
4See Chakravorti (2010) for an excellent review of the growing payment card literature
and discussion of the impact of regulatory interventions on card adoption, usage, and wel-
fare. See Murphy and Ott (1977) and Carlton and Frankel (1995) for background on the
institutional literature on NSRs.
5The analysis primarily addresses a closed network, but it may also characterize a four-
party network if acquirers (issuers) are identical and perfectly competitive, while issuers
(acquirers) are identical and collude when setting the fees to cardholders (merchants). One
advantage of a three-party model is that the interchange fee does not need to be modeled,
which in a four-party setup compensates the issuing bank each time cardholders use a card
in a purchase.
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quantity of goods transacted. Second, it considers positive network e¤ects
of card-accepting merchants on cardholders which, with very few exceptions
(Economides and Henriques, 2011), have not been modelled in previous articles
on the NSR.
This paper contributes to the study of the economic (in)e¢ ciencies entailed
by the NSR and highlights the: (i) improvement in retail price e¢ ciency for
cardholders, and (ii) ine¢ ciency in merchant acceptance of card payments.
Under the NSR, cardholders pay lower prices (closer to marginal cost) at card-
accepting merchants, which improves price e¢ ciency for card transactions,
while cash payers pay higher prices. A relevant aspect in the model is that
converting payments from cash to card generates cost savings for merchants.
Thus, the NSR can improve payment e¢ ciency and social welfare by shifting
output from cash payers to cardholders, and may be an instrument to de-
crease cash usage. Nonetheless, if network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, with
the exception of the EPN, all groups of agents (cash payers, cardholders and
merchants), and society as a whole, will be worse o¤ under the NSR. This is
because the network size of card-accepting merchants matters to cardholders
and under the NSR fewer merchants are willing to accept card payments given
their inability to price discriminate, while cash payers face higher retail prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
to compare the equilibrium when merchants are allowed to surcharge card
payments against the equilibrium under the NSR. Section 3 sets out the social
optimum as a benchmark. Section 4 shows the equilibrium when merchants
are allowed to surcharge card payments. Section 5 shows the equilibrium under
the NSR. Section 6 analyzes the welfare variations and e¢ ciency e¤ects as a
result of the NSR implementation. Section 7 concludes the paper. Proofs can
be found in the Appendix.
2 The model
This section sets out a model with two payment instruments (cash and
cards), characterizes each participating agent (consumers, merchants and a
proprietary EPN) and describes how they interact in a sequential game. Cash
is the default payment instrument, accessible to all consumers and merchants
at no cost. As compared to cash, the EPN o¤ers a service for electronic
payments that may yield positive benets for consumers and merchants. The
elements of the model are as follows.
Consumers. There is a mass one of consumers split into two types: E-type
(cardholders able to make electronic transactions) and C-type (cash payers).6
6In the US the fraction of households with a credit card has been steady at about 70 to
75% during the past two decades suggesting the maturity of the market (Schuh, Shy and
Stavins, 2010). About 24% of US households do not hold cards of any kind (Schwartz and
Vincent, 2006). These families may be unable to get payment cards or have a preference for
anonymity when making a transaction.
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E-type consumers have mass  2 (0; 1) and can pay for goods using either
cash or card from an EPN.7 C-type consumers, with mass 1   , can only
purchase goods using cash payments.8 The demand for a good per cash payer
is
qc (pc)  v   pc, (1)
where v > 0 is the consumersmaximal willingness to pay for the good itself,
and pc is the unit price for a cash payer. The consumer surplus per cash payer
is then given by CSc 
R v
pc
qc (x) dx. When using a payment card, the demand
for a good per cardholder is
qe (pe)  v + r   pe, (2)
where pe is the unit price with a card payment, and r  0 is a reward per
unit purchased. Rewards can be thought of as a negative price of card use,
e.g. taking the form of direct monetary rebates (cashback), or goods, such as
frequent yer points. The consumer surplus per cardholder paying with card
is then given by CSe 
R v+r
pe
qe (x) dx. If a cardholder purchases a good with
cash, e.g. because the merchant accepts only cash, the demand in that instance
(at that specic merchant) is given by (1), rather than (2). For simplicity,
consumers can choose how to nance their purchases independently of the
payment instrument, i.e. any cash payer or cardholder may negotiate loans
directly with merchants or any nancial institutions. Alternatively, if a rent is
generated for the EPN in terms of interest charged on credit to cardholders,
then r may be interpreted as rewards net of rents.9
Each consumer buys from every merchant (described further below), and
cardholders care about the network size of card-accepting merchants. In par-
ticular, the larger the network of card-accepting merchants, the bigger the
benet of holding a payment card (network e¤ect). A reason for this may be
the security of paying by card, rather than cash. If cash is stolen, it is unlikely
to be recovered. Whereas if a payment card is stolen, the cardholder can cancel
the card immediately before fraudulent purchases are made. Moreover, EPNs
have sophisticated safeguards (e.g. real time active fraud detection system,
chip & PIN authentication) in place to protect cardholders in the event of
unauthorized use. Thus, a larger merchant acceptance may lead cardholders
to carry a smaller amount of cash. Also, access to cash may imply a cost, e.g.
time and fees to withdraw cash from banks. Let D  0 denote the network size
of card-accepting merchants, and bB  0 the benet brought to a cardholder
7Cashless payments represent 92% of transactions in France, 89% in the UK, 62% in
Japan and 31% in Russia (MasterCard, 2013).
8Cash payments represent 45% of transactions in China and 20% in the US. Only 14% of
payments made in Australia are cash, while in Egypt cash represents 93% of transactions.
Worldwide, around 85% of all retail payment transactions are done with cash (MasterCard,
2013).
9See Agarwal, Chakravorti and Lunn (2010), Chakravorti and Emmons (2003), and
Chakravorti and To (2007) for discussions on credit cards and empirical support that banks
may use rewards to steal customers and their outstanding debt from other cards. In this
model, I abstract from business stealing between banks treating that aspect independently
of the NSR e¤ects.
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by the marginal card-accepting merchant. Thus, the term bBD, in addition to
the total consumer surplus per cardholder, measures the benet from access-
ing a card acceptance network of D merchants. Note that bB is unrelated to
consumerswillingness to pay (demand) for the goods themselves.
Merchants. There is a mass one of merchants, each of whom is a prot-
maximizing local monopolist supplying an independent good. A monopoly
provides a rst-order approximation to markets where merchants have market
power. Such a market structure facilitates the welfare analysis of the NSR as
it lters out strategic e¤ects that typically arise in oligopolies. Wright (2004)
addressed the case of Hotelling competition between merchants, however con-
sidering inelastic consumer demand. In such a case, card-accepting merchants
are able to attract additional customers from rivals who accept cash only, but
this e¤ect is regardless of the NSR.
The marginal cost of producing a good is c, where 0 < c < v. Merchants
bear a fee m  0 as a supply cost per card payment, while not facing explicit
costs for cash payments. They have heterogeneous card use benets, bS per
card payment, where bS is uniformly distributed on

0;bS

. Merchants know
their own bS which reects a benet from cash-handling cost reduction or
increased payment security compared to cash. The EPN knows the distribution
of bS but not the transactional benet from card acceptance for individual
merchants. I assume that: (i) bS  c, otherwise the net marginal cost of a
card transaction (c  bS) would be negative for merchants with bS su¢ ciently
high; and (ii) bS  v   c to ensure that cash payers are served in equilibrium
when the NSR is in place.
The prot of a merchant with benet bS is (pe   c+ bS  m) qe (pe) per
cardholder paying with card and (pc   c) qc (pc) per cash payer, where qe (pe)
and qc (pc) are dened by (2) and (1), respectively. Assuming that cardholders
pay with card whenever possible, which will be veried in equilibrium, for
given values of (m; r), a merchants prot is
(bS) =

(pc   c) (v   pc)
 (pe   c+ bS  m) (v + r   pe) + (1  ) (pc   c) (v   pc)
if only cash
if cash and card .
(3)
All merchants must accept cash due to its status as legal tender, but will
accept card payments if and only if accepting cash and card is at least as
protable as accepting only cash. In this model, the incentives for a merchant
to accept card payments are: (i) benets from card use bS, and (ii) higher
demand for goods from cardholders (depending on card rewards r). Another
reason why a merchant may accept card payments is business stealing. How-
ever, since by assumption merchants are local monopolists, such an e¤ect is
disregarded in this model.
Electronic Payment Network. Economides (2009) compared the NSR to
a most-favored customer clause which can be used to increase the fees to collu-
sive levels across the EPNs. To abstract away from strategic (anti-competitive)
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e¤ects that may be introduced by the NSR, consider that there is only one
prot-maximizing EPN. Although the monopoly case does not occur in prac-
tice, Cabral (2006) suggested that it may provide a good rst-order approxi-
mation to the reality of a number of countries, and the assumption has been
used in the literature, e.g. Schwartz and Vincent (2006).
The EPN charges a merchant fee, m, per card payment while simultane-
ously nancing a reward, r, to the cardholder. Hence, the EPN must choose
m  r, otherwise it would have negative prot. A card payment requires the
merchant (payee) and the cardholder (payer) to have a common EPN.
Without loss of generality, the EPNs marginal cost of servicing a card
transaction is normalized to zero.10 I assume for simplicity, and likewise
Schwartz and Vincent (2006), that only linear pricing is feasible for the EPN.
While in reality some EPNs may set membership fees (e.g. annual cardholder
fees) there is no reason for them in this model given the assumption that there
is a xed mass of cardholders. The EPN solves the following maximization
problem
max
m;r
EPN (m; r) = (m  r)T (m; r)
where T (m; r)  bS
R bS
bS
qe (bS) dbS is the total volume of card transactions,
and bS denotes the card use benet at which a merchant is indi¤erent between
accepting cash and card payments, or only cash.
Summary and timing of the game. The participating agents interact
according to the following sequential game. First, the EPN or the competent
authority in case of an intervention aiming at maximizing social welfare sets
whether merchants are either allowed to surcharge card payments, or not.
Second, given the rule, the EPN sets the merchant fee, m, and the cardholder
reward, r, per card payment. Third, merchants observe (m; r) and decide
whether to accept card payments or not. Fourth, merchants accepting only
cash dene the price pc (bS), while merchants accepting both cash and card
payments dene pc (bS) and pe (bS), respectively. Fifth, consumers without
a payment card can only complete transactions with cash, while cardholders
can choose between cash and card at card-accepting merchants. If a merchant
chooses to accept only cash, all consumers regardless of holding a payment
card may only purchase goods with cash at that merchant. A summary of the
timing of the game follows in Table 1 below.
10The EPN may have to support a xed cost, which must be su¢ ciently small such that,
in equilibrium, prot is non-negative. Otherwise, the EPN would exit the market and no
alternative to cash payments would be provided.
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Table 1: The timing of the game
I. The EPN or competent authority sets the payment system rule (sur-
charging or NSR)
II. The EPN sets the merchant fee, m, and the cardholder reward, r, per
card payment
III. Merchants decide whether to join the EPN, or not
IV. Merchants set prices for goods (pc (bS) and pe (bS) if it is a card-accepting
merchant, or only pc (bS) if it is a merchant that accepts only cash)
V. Consumers decide which payment instrument to use at each merchant,
conditional on the set of payment instruments accepted by each merchant
A summary of the models notation is shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Notation
Exogenous variables
 Mass of cardholders
v Maximal willingness to pay for a unit of a good
c Marginal cost of producing a good
bB Cardholder benet (network e¤ect) of having an additional merchant
accepting card payments
bS Merchant benet of a card transaction relatively to cash
bS Maximum value of bS
Endogenous variables
D Mass of card-accepting merchants
qe Demand, per cardholder, for a good
qc Demand, per cash payer, for a good
pe Price of a unit of a good with card payment processed under the EPN
pc Price of a unit of a good when cash is used for payment
CSc Consumer surplus, per cash payer, for a good
CSe Consumer surplus, per cardholder paying with card, for a good
m Merchant fee per card transaction processed under the EPN
r Cardholder reward per card transaction processed under the EPN
T Total number of card transactions processed under the EPN
3 The social optimum benchmark
This section sets out the rst-best solution as benchmark. Hereafter, a
variable with opt in superscript refers to the model in the rst-best. Merchant
fees and cardholder rewards may be construed as transfers from merchants
to the EPN and from the EPN to cardholders, respectively. For that reason
card fees and rewards are not relevant in the rst-best analysis. In the rst-
best, merchants should join the EPN whenever the social benet arising from
card usage (e.g. cash-handling cost reduction, increased security in payments)
exceeds the social cost of doing so, which is zero by assumption, i.e. bS  0.
All cardholders should use their cards, and all merchants should accept card
payments, i.e. Dopt = 1, because this is the most cost-e¢ cient solution to
make payments in the model. Also, the positive network e¤ect on cardholders
is maximized when all merchants accept card payments.
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The output level for each good that achieves the maximum total surplus
is such that the marginal social benet equals the marginal social cost. Thus,
the social optimal solution entails prices set at poptc = c and p
opt
e (bS) = c  bS
implying zero-prot for merchants.
The total surplus in the economy is then
TSopt = 
 Z bS
0
Z v
c bS
(v   x) dx

dbS +D
optbB
!
+(1  )
Z bS
0
Z v
c
(v   x) dx

dbS.
The EPNs market power to set merchant fees net of rewards (to cardholders)
above cost, i.e. m  r > 0, is a market distortion that prevents the social opti-
mum from being achieved in the absence of intervention. Similarly, merchants
have an incentive and market power to charge retail prices above the respective
marginal cost of the good. As will be shown further below, the NSR is unable
to fully eliminate the negative e¤ects of such market distortion on welfare, as
also happens in Wright (2003), but can mitigate retail price ine¢ ciency for
cardholders.
4 Equilibrium with card payment surcharges
This section sets out the equilibrium when merchants are allowed to sur-
charge card payments. Hereafter, a variable with  in superscript refers to the
model with merchant surcharging. Given the demands (1) and (2) for a cash
payer and a cardholder, respectively, a merchant with a card use benet bS
sets
pc =
v + c
2
and (4)
pe (bS) =
v + c+m+ r   bS
2
. (5)
Merchants will accept payments with the EPN if and only if accepting
cash and card is at least as protable as accepting only cash. Only merchants
with bS su¢ ciently high will accept card payments, in particular bS  bS 
m   r. Thus, the mass of card-accepting merchants will be D (m  r) =R bS
m r
1
bS
dbS = 1   m rbS . The card surcharge at a card-accepting merchant,
pe (bS)   pc = m+r bS2 , is positive at least for merchants with a low card use
benet (around bS). Card surcharges are decreasing in the card use benet
that merchants have, therefore, merchants with bS su¢ ciently high may choose
not to surcharge. This is consistent with the Australian experience where the
Payments System Board required the removal of the NSR on credit cards from
2003 and credit card surcharge levels have varied across di¤erent merchants
since then (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011).
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Given the prices in (4) and (5), the surplus of a consumer in a merchant is
CSc =
(v   c)2
8
if cash payment, or
CSe =
(v   c+ bS   (m  r))2
8
if card payment.
A cardholder chooses a card payment, rather than cash, if and only if CSc 
CSe , bS  m   r. Hence, at card-accepting merchants (i.e. those in the
range bS  bS  bS), a cardholder chooses to pay with card, rather than cash.
The total volume of card transactions is T (m  r) = bS
R bS
m r
v c (m r)+bS
2
dbS,
which is function of m  r, but not m or r separately. The EPNs problem can
be written as
max
m rbS
EPN (m  r) = (m  r)T (m  r) .
This leads to the well-known neutrality result set out in Proposition 1 be-
low. Similar results are discussed for example in Gans and King (2003), and
Schwartz and Vincent (2006).
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium with merchant surcharging, the volume of
card transactions, merchantsprots and the EPNs prot depend only on the
EPNs margin m   r, and not on m and r individually. That is, if (m; r)
maximizes the EPNs prot, then so does any pair (m0; r0) where m0   r0 =
m   r.
Proposition 1 above is in line with the standard result that the e¤ective in-
cidence of a tax does not depend on whether it is formally placed on consumers
or on merchants. This proposition is a general property of payment systems
when merchants can surcharge (Gans and King, 2003). However, as will be-
come clear in the next section, in the presence of the NSR, the EPNs prot
depends on m and r individually. When merchants are allowed to surcharge
card payments, the solution of the EPNs problem is
m   r = 2
3
 
v   c+bS
  1
3
q
4 (v   c)2 +bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

. (6)
It is noteworthy that 0 < m   r < bS ensuring a non-zero mass of card-
accepting merchants, in particularD (m   r) = 1 
2
3(v c+bS)  13
q
4(v c)2+bS(2(v c)+bS)
bS
.
5 Equilibrium under the NSR
Under the NSR each card-accepting merchant sets a single price regardless
of the payment instrument chosen by the consumer. Hereafter, a variable with
NSR in superscript refers to the model under the NSR. Merchants that accept
only cash set pNSRc =
v+c
2
, while card-accepting merchants with a card use
benet bS set a uniform price at pNSRe (bS) =
v+c+(m+r bS)
2
. Only merchants
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with bS su¢ ciently high will accept card payments, in particular
bS  bNSRS (m; r) 
q
(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r    (m+ r))

.
(7)
Proposition 2 Fix m and r at any given positive level. Compared to the
case where merchants are allowed to surcharge, the mass of card-accepting
merchants is lower under the NSR.
Proposition 2 can be shown by comparing the expression bNSRS (m; r) in (7)
against bS (m; r)  m  r, which results in bNSRS (m; r) > bS (m; r), and conse-
quently DNSR (m; r) < D (m; r). Under the NSR the mass of card-accepting
merchants is DNSR (m; r) = 1   bNSRS (m; r) =bS. Card-accepting merchants
are worse o¤ under the NSR through being constrained in the ability to price
discriminate. This and the results further below hold qualitatively regardless
of the scale of card-accepting merchants and the proportion of cardholders in
the economy. Some merchants choosing to accept card payments when allowed
to surcharge choose not to do so under the NSR. When merchants are allowed
to surcharge, and thus price discriminate per payment method, they have a
greater incentive to accept card payments because they gain a second price in-
strument allowing them to capture further value from consumers. This result
may help to explain why the share of merchants surcharging credit cards has
grown signicantly after the NSR ban in Australia.
The EPNs problem is
max
m;r
NSREPN (m; r) = (m  r)TNSR (m; r) subject to
TNSR (m; r) =

bS
Z bS
bNSRS (m;r)

v   c   (m+ r   bS)
2
+ r

dbS,
bNSRS (m; r)  bS.
The optimal solution for the EPNs problem entails8<: mNSR = v c3 + 5bS6  
q
4(v c)2+bS(2(v c)+bS)
6
rNSR =  v c
3
+
bS
6
+
q
4(v c)2+bS(2(v c)+bS)
6
, (8)
where mNSR + rNSR = bS, mNSR   rNSR = m   r, and m   r is dened
in (6). The EPNs prot margin is the same regardless of the NSR. This is
because neither (i) the degree of competition in the provision of electronic
payment services, nor (ii) the size of the group of cardholders was a¤ected by
the NSR. On (i), Economides (2009) suggested that with multiple EPNs the
NSR may serve the purpose of increasing the prot margin to collusive levels
among the EPNs. However, the assumption of a monopolist EPN in my model
rules out such potential anti-competitive e¤ects brought about by the NSR.
To the extent that such an assumption is a good approximation to a number of
countries (Cabral, 2006), the magnitude of the impact of the NSR on the EPNs
prot margin will be relatively limited. On (ii), the assumption of a xed
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mass  of cardholders does not capture potential variations in the size of this
group when the NSR is in force. Nevertheless, Kinsey (1981) and Amendola,
Pellecchia and Sensini (2016) found that consumersdecisions to subscribe to
a credit card can be broadly explained by reasons that are independent of the
NSR, such as: income, place of residence, use of checking and savings accounts,
attitude towards credit, age and occupation. Even considering elastic card
adoption in the model, it is unclear how the mass of cardholders would vary
by virtue of the NSR. On the one hand, under the NSR, consumers are better
o¤ paying with card compared to cash because cardholders receive rewards for
the same retail price, which incentivizes card adoption. On the other hand,
the mass of card-accepting merchants is lower under the NSR (Proposition 2)
discouraging consumers to adopt payment cards.
Proposition 3 Compared to when surcharging is allowed, if the NSR is im-
posed, then: (i) for merchants that accept card payments under the NSR, the
volume of cash transactions will fall and the volume of card transactions will
rise, while the total volume of transactions will remain unchanged; (ii) for
merchants that accept card payments only when surcharging is allowed, the to-
tal volume of transactions will fall; and (iii) the total volume of transactions
in the economy as a whole will fall.
When surcharging is permitted, cash payers face lower retail prices than
cardholders at card-accepting merchants, i.e. pc =
v+c
2
 v+c+(bS bS)
2
=
pe (bS). The NSR imposes a single price constraint on retail prices paid by cash
payers and cardholders at card-accepting merchants. Such constraint induces
card-accepting merchants to set the level of that single price at pNSRe (bS) =
v+c+(bS bS)
2
, where pc  pNSRe (bS)  pe (bS) since 0 <  < 1 and bS 2

0;bS

by assumption.11 Compared to when surcharging is permitted, under the NSR
cash payers pay more and cardholders pay less at card-accepting merchants.
Hence, the NSR results in falling volumes of cash transactions and rising vol-
umes of card transactions at card-accepting merchants. This is consistent
with surveys suggesting that surcharging has steered consumers away from us-
ing credit cards towards cash in Australia (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2011).
In general, the net impact of the NSR on the total volume of transactions per
card-accepting merchant is unclear. However, in this model the total volume
of transactions per card-accepting merchant remains unchanged because of the
linearity of demands.
Proposition 2 points out that there are fewer card-accepting merchants
under the NSR. This is because some merchants only accept card payments
if allowed to surcharge. Should surcharging be allowed, a cardholder buys a
quantity qe (bS) =
v c (m r)+bS
2
per card-accepting merchant, while a cash
payer purchases qc =
v c
2
 qe (bS), since bS  m   r. If the NSR is in
11The assumption bS  v   c ensures that the group of cash payers will be served when
the NSR is in force. Under this condition, pNSRe (bS) is lower than cash payersmaximal
willingness to pay for a unit of a good, v.
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force, at merchants that accept card payments only when allowed to surcharge,
cardholders have no option but to pay cash and thus choose to buy fewer units
of the good (than if they could pay by card and receive rewards), while cash
payers face the same retail price and buy the same quantity regardless of the
NSR implementation.
In a nutshell, if the NSR is implemented, the total volume of transactions
will: (i) decrease for merchants in the range bS 2

bS; b
NSR
S

(i.e. those that
only accept card payments when allowed to surcharge); and (ii) remain un-
changed for merchants in the ranges bS 2

bNSRS ;
bS

(i.e. those that always
accept card payments irrespective of the NSR) and bS 2 [0; bS) (i.e. those
that never accept card payments irrespective of the NSR). Therefore, the to-
tal volume of transactions in the economy as a whole will fall with the NSR
implementation.
6 Welfare analysis and e¢ ciency
In this section, I investigate the NSR e¤ect on social welfare and economic
e¢ ciency in the absence and presence of network e¤ects.
Proposition 4 In the absence of network e¤ects, i.e. bB = 0, and compared to
the equilibrium where merchants are allowed to surcharge, under the NSR: (i)
the EPNs prot margin per card transaction (m  r) and prot level remain
unchanged; (ii) cash payers make fewer transactions and the respective con-
sumer surplus falls; (iii) cardholders make more transactions and the respective
consumer surplus rises; and (iv) merchantsprots fall.
Under the NSR, the merchant fee and cardholder reward
 
mNSR; rNSR

are determined in (8). In the model, the EPNs prot margin mNSR  rNSR is
the same as under surcharging. Proposition 3 states that the volume of card
transactions per card-accepting merchant rises as a result of the NSR. However,
fewer merchants will accept card payments under the NSR (Proposition 2).
These two e¤ects o¤set each other resulting in an unchanged total volume of
card transactions in the economy as a whole. Given that neither the EPNs
prot margin, nor the total volume of card transactions is altered with the
NSR, the EPNs prot is invariant to the NSR. Note though that this relies
on the assumptions that (i) the EPN is a monopolist, and (ii) the size of the
group of cardholders is una¤ected by the NSR. Allowing for competition at
the EPN level and (or) an expansion in the group of cardholders, the EPNs
prot would potentially increase with the NSR.
Under the NSR, cash payers will make fewer transactions at card-accepting
merchants. This is because card-accepting merchants mark up retail prices for
all consumers resulting in cardholders being subsidized by cash payers.12
12The welfare transfers from cash payers to cardholders have been researched both the-
oretically and empirically, e.g. Gans and King (2003), Schwartz and Vincent (2006), and
Schuh, Shy and Stavins (2010).
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Merchant fees are passed on to all consumers in the form of higher retail prices
irrespective of the payment instrument. Thus, under the NSR, cash payers
face higher retail prices to cover merchant fees associated with card payments.
Given that the EPN uses merchant fees to nance rewards to cardholders,
and cash payers do not receive rewards, cash payers also nance part of the
cardholder rewards. As a result, cash payersconsumer surplus is lower under
the NSR.
Despite the fact that fewer merchants accept card payments under the
NSR (Proposition 2), cardholders make the same volume of card transactions.
Cardholders concentrate the volume of card transactions in a smaller group
of merchants (i.e. the card-accepting merchants under the NSR) increasing
the volume of card transactions per card-accepting merchant. Additionally,
given that under the NSR more merchants accept only cash, cardholders make
more cash transactions (keeping xed the volume of cash transactions per
merchant, as compared to the surcharge equilibrium). In a nutshell, under
the NSR, cardholders complete the same total volume of card transactions but
make more cash transactions, as compared to the surcharge equilibrium.
The NSR imposes two welfare e¤ects on cardholders. On the one hand, the
subsidye¤ect from cash payers increases their surplus. On the other hand,
the reduction in merchant acceptance of card payments decreases cardholders
surplus. In the absence of network e¤ects, the subsidye¤ect dominates the
merchant acceptancee¤ect. This is because in the model the total volume of
transactions per cardholder increases with the NSR and as a result cardholders
are better o¤.
The group of card-accepting merchants is clearly worse o¤ through being
constrained in their ability to price discriminate consumers depending on the
payment instrument. The merchants with a su¢ ciently low card use bene-
t, i.e. those in the range bS 2 [0; bS) that will choose to accept only cash
regardless of the NSR, are indi¤erent to the NSR.
In a nutshell, the NSR generates opposite welfare variations on di¤erent
groups of agents. To better understand the impacts of the NSR, I discuss
below two aspects of economic e¢ ciency: retail price e¢ ciency for cardholders,
and (in)e¢ ciency in merchant acceptance of payment cards in the presence of
network e¤ects.
6.1 NSR and retail price e¢ ciency for cardholders
In general, monopolists do not e¢ ciently price goods. The negative slope
of the demand for goods means that the price charged by a monopolist mer-
chant is above the marginal revenue. As prot-maximizing merchants equate
marginal revenue with marginal cost, the price is set above marginal cost.
Proposition 3 (i) suggests that for card-accepting merchants the implementa-
tion of the NSR results in a rising volume of card transactions and a falling
volume of cash transactions, while the total volume of transactions remains
unchanged. This is because pc  pNSRe (bS)  pe (bS) and thus, under the
NSR, cardholders pay a lower price (closer to marginal cost) which improves
retail price e¢ ciency for goods sold to cardholders. The NSR is mitigating a
problem of double-marginalization of card payments.
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A relevant aspect in the model is that converting payments from cash
to card generates cost savings for merchants. Thus, the NSR can improve
payment e¢ ciency by shifting output from cash payers to cardholders. Also,
it is noteworthy that in this model the total volume of card transactions in
the economy as a whole is the same regardless of the NSR. However, under
the NSR, card transactions are completed with merchants in the range of
bS 2

bNSRS ;
bS

, rather than bS 2

bS;bS

when surcharging is feasible, where
bNSRS > b

S (Proposition 2). Implementing the NSR shifts card transactions to-
wards more cost-e¤ective merchants (with higher bS) enhancing social welfare.
For example, consider the case where
 
v; c; ;bS; bB

= (100; 50; 0:75; 5; 0),
i.e. consumersmaximal willingness to pay for the good itself is normalized to
100, the marginal cost is half of v (allowing for 25% prot margin to a merchant
that only accepts cash), 75% of consumers are cardholders (US case for credit
cards), the merchantsmaximal card use benet is 5% of v (equivalent to 10%
reduction in the marginal cost), and there are no network e¤ects. For the
parameter values above, the EPN sets (m; r) =
 
mNSR; rNSR

= (3:7; 1:3).
Taking as reference the price of a merchant that only accepts cash, the EPN
prices mean a merchant fee of c. 5% and cardholder rewards of c. 1:7%. The
total surplus in the economy would increase by more than 0:5% with the NSR
compared to the surcharge equilibrium. This result holds qualitatively for a
number of other sets of parameters that exclude network e¤ects.
6.2 NSR, network e¤ects and (in)e¢ ciency in merchant
acceptance
E¢ ciency in merchant acceptance of payment cards involves minimizing
the costs of supplying a good. In this model, the costs associated with a card
transaction are lower compared to cash. From the social perspective, it is
cost-e¤ective that all merchants accept card payments, i.e. Dopt = 1 (Section
3). Moreover, due to security concerns and (or) cardholdersopportunity cost
regarding the time required to withdraw cash from banks, cardholders care
about the network size of card-accepting merchants where they can use their
cards. This network e¤ect of merchants on cardholders can be taken into
account by setting bB > 0.
If bB is su¢ ciently high, with the exception of the EPN, all agents (cash
payers, cardholders and merchants) are worse o¤ with the NSR implementa-
tion. The reasons why cash payers and merchants are worse o¤, and card-
holders better o¤ with the NSR implementation were already discussed above
(after Proposition 4) for the case where there are no network e¤ects. How-
ever, cardholders may strongly prefer an EPN with larger merchant accep-
tance. Given that fewer merchants accept card payments under the NSR, a
su¢ ciently strong preference for not carrying cash (i.e. a su¢ ciently strong
network e¤ect) implies that cardholders will be also worse o¤ under the NSR
as compared to the surcharge equilibrium. In a nutshell, implementing the
NSR in the presence of su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects makes cash payers,
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cardholders and merchants all worse o¤, the EPN is indi¤erent (Proposition
4), while the total surplus in the economy decreases.
7 Conclusions
This paper sets out a three-party model with consumers (cash payers and
cardholders), merchants (local monopolists) and an EPN to assess the e¢ -
ciency and welfare e¤ects of the NSR for card payments. I consider in this
model: (i) merchant heterogeneity with respect to card use benets, (ii) pos-
itive network e¤ects of merchants on cardholders and (iii) endogenous trans-
action volumes. The contribution of this paper is three-fold.
First, it provides an argument for the implementation of the NSR based on
economic e¢ ciency. Compared to the surcharge equilibrium, card transactions
have a lower retail price under the NSR, which improves retail price e¢ ciency
for cardholders. A relevant aspect in the model is that converting payments
from cash to card generates cost savings for merchants. Thus, the NSR can
improve payment e¢ ciency and promote social welfare by shifting output from
cash payers to cardholders. This suggests that the NSR may contribute to the
goal of some policymakers to decrease cash usage, e.g. to mitigate tax evasion.
Second, it discusses the welfare variations introduced by the NSR in the
presence of network e¤ects. If network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong, with the
exception of the EPN, all groups of agents (cash payers, cardholders and mer-
chants), and society as a whole, are worse o¤ with the NSR implementation.
This is because fewer merchants accept card payments under the NSR, and the
network size of card-accepting merchants matters to cardholders. This sug-
gests that network e¤ects play a relevant role in whether the NSR is socially
desirable.
Third, it suggests that the social optimal policy on the NSR may dif-
fer from market to market (see also Economides and Henriques, 2011). In
competitive markets, allowing for card surcharges can be socially preferable
to the NSR to incentivise competition at the EPN level. However, in markets
where merchants have signicant market power, the NSR mitigates the double-
marginalization of card payments and improves payment e¢ ciency. This latter
e¤ect contributes to the view that in non-competitive markets the NSR is so-
cially preferable rather than to allow card payment surcharges.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The EPNs problem is
max
m;r
EPN (m; r) = (m  r)T (m; r) subject to
T (m; r) =

bS
Z bS
m r
v   c  (m  r) + bS
2
dbS
bS  m  r.
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Replacing m   r  X, the EPNs problem can be re-written as a single-
variable maximization problem
max
XbS
EPN (X) =
X
2bS

(v   c X)  bS  X+ b2S
2
  X
2
2

.
Let X denote the solution for the EPNs problem above. If m   r = X
and m0   r0 = m   r, then it follows that m0   r0 = X. 
Proof of Proposition 2 This proof consists in showing that DNSR (m; r) <
D (m; r), whereDNSR (m; r)  1  bNSRS (m;r)bS andD (m; r)  1 
bS(m;r)
bS
. Thus,
DNSR (m; r) < D (m; r) , bNSRS (m; r) > bS (m; r), where bNSRS (m; r) p
(v c)2+4(1 )r(v c+r) (v c+2r (m+r))

and bS (m; r)  m   r. It can be shown
that bNSRS (m; r) > b

S (m; r) since
1

q
(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r)  (v   c+ 2r    (m+ r))

> m  r ,q
(v   c)2 + 4 (1  ) r (v   c+ r) > v   c+ 2r (1  ), 4 (1  ) r2 > 0,
given that 0 <  < 1 and r > 0 by assumption. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (i) Merchants with card use benets in the range
bNSRS ;
bS

accept card payments under the NSR. The volume of cash transac-
tions, per merchant, in the range

bNSRS ;
bS

is: (1  ) qc = (1  ) v c2 under
surcharging, and (1  ) qNSRc = (1  )
v c (bS bS)
2
under the NSR. It is
straightforward that (1  ) qc  (1  ) qNSRc given that 0  bS  bS.
The total volume of transactions, per merchant, in the range

bNSRS ;
bS

is
Q (bS)  qe +(1  ) qc =
v   c   (m   r   bS)
2
under surcharging, and
QNSR (bS)  qNSRe +(1  ) qNSRc =
v   c    mNSR   rNSR   bS
2
under the NSR.
Given that m   r = mNSR   rNSR, therefore Q (bS) = QNSR (bS), and
consequently qe  qNSRe because (1  ) qc  (1  ) qNSRc .
(ii) Merchants with transactional benets in the range

bS; b
NSR
S

will ac-
cept card payments if surcharging is allowed, otherwise, under the NSR, these
merchant will accept only cash. The total volume of transactions, per mer-
chant, in the range

bS; b
NSR
S

, is
Q (bS) =
v   c   (m   r   bS)
2
under surcharging, and
QNSR =
v   c
2
, under the NSR.
Using the fact that m   r = bS and bS  bS, thus Q (bS)  QNSR.
(iii) The total volume of transactions remains unchanged for merchants in
the range [0; bS) as these merchants always choose to accept only cash irre-
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spective of the NSR. If the NSR is implemented, the total volume of transac-
tions will remain unchanged for merchants in the range

bNSRS ;
bS

as shown in
(i), while the total volume of transactions will fall for merchants in the range
bS; b
NSR
S

as shown in (ii). Thus, for the economy as a whole, the total volume
of transactions decreases with the NSR implementation. 
Proof of Proposition 4 (i) The solution of the EPNs problem, when mer-
chants are allowed to surcharge, is given by
m   r = 2
3
 
v   c+bS
  1
3
q
4 (v   c)2 +bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

.
The solution of the EPNs problem, when merchants are under the NSR, is
given by8<: mNSR =
1
3
(v   c) + 5
6
bS   16
q
bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2
rNSR =  1
3
(v   c) + 1
6
bS +
1
6
q
bS
 
2 (v   c) + bS

+ 4 (v   c)2
,
thus mNSR   rNSR = m   r.
When merchants are allowed to surcharge, the volume of card transactions
is given by
T  (m; r) =

bS
Z bS
m r
v   c  (m   r) + bS
2
dbS,
while under the NSR, the volume of card transactions is
TNSR
 
mNSR; rNSR

=

bS
Z bS
bNSRS (m
NSR;rNSR)
 
v   c    mNSR + rNSR   bS
2
+ rNSR
!
dbS,
where bNSRS
 
mNSR; rNSR

is dened in (7). Given thatmNSR rNSR = m r
and T  (m; r) depends on m   r, rather than on m and r individually,
thus T  (m; r) = T 
 
mNSR; rNSR

. Assuming without loss of generality that
m = mNSR = m and r = rNSR = r,
T  (m; r)  TNSR (m; r) =  (1  )
 
bS   (m+ r)
2
4bS
= 0,
given that, in equilibrium, m+r = mNSR+rNSR = bS. Thus, the EPNs prot
is the same irrespective of the NSR.
(ii) If merchants are allowed to surcharge, a cash payer will buy qc =
v c
2
from each and every merchant. Under the NSR, a cash payer buys qc =
v c
2
from each merchant that accepts only cash, while buying qNSRc (bS) =
v c (bS bS)
2
from each card-accepting merchant. Thus, the aggregate volume
of transactions made by a cash payer must be lower under the NSR, given that
bS  bS by assumption.
If merchants are allowed to surcharge, the consumer surplus of a cash user
is (v   c)2 =8 at each and every merchant. Under the NSR, the consumer
surplus of a cash user is (v   c)2 =8 at merchants accepting only cash, and 
v   c    bS   bS2 =8 at card-accepting merchants. Thus, the consumer
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surplus of a cash payer must be lower under the NSR, given that bS  bS by
assumption.
(iii) If merchants are allowed to surcharge, the total volume of transactions
per cardholder is
v   c
2
m   r
bS
+
1
bS
Z bS
m r
v   c+ r  m+ bS
2
dbS, (9)
and the consumer surplus generated by such volume of transactions is
(v   c)2
8
m   r
bS
+
1
bS
Z bS
m r
1
2

v   c  (m  r) + bS
2
2
dbS. (10)
Under the NSR, the total volume of transactions per cardholder is
v   c
2
bNSRS
 
mNSR; rNSR

bS
+
1
bS
Z bS
bNSRS (m
NSR;rNSR)
 
v   c    bS   bS
2
+ rNSR
!
dbS,
(11)
and the consumer surplus generated by such volume of transactions is
(v   c)2
8
bNSRS
 
mNSR; rNSR

bS
+
1
bS
Z bS
bNSRS (m
NSR;rNSR)
1
2
 
v   c    bS   bS
2
+ rNSR
!2
dbS,
(12)
where bNSRS
 
mNSR; rNSR

is dened in (7).
The expression in (9) is smaller than the one in (11). Using the fact that
mNSR + rNSR = bS, the di¤erence between (11) and (9) can be written as
(v   c)
q
4r (1  ) (v   c+ r) + (v   c)2   2r (1  )  (v   c)
2bS
> 0, 4 (1  ) r2 > 0.
(13)
The expression in (10) is smaller than the one in (12). Using the fact that
mNSR + rNSR = bS, the di¤erence between (12) and (10), denoted by TCSe
below, can be written as
TCSe =
 
(12 (v   c) + 8r) (1  ) r2   2 (v   c)3
+
 
2 (v   c)2   4r (1  ) (v   c+ r)q4r (1  ) (v   c+ r) + (v   c)2
!
24bS
.
(14)
Applying algebraic manipulation and the rst inequality in (13) to TCSe it
can be concluded that TCSe > 0.
(iv) Merchants with transactional benets in the range [0; bS) only accept
cash irrespective of the NSR implementation. Thus, the prot for these mer-
chants is the same regardless of the NSR.
Merchants with transactional benets in the range

bS; b
NSR
S

will accept
card payments, if surcharging is allowed; otherwise, under the NSR, the mer-
chant will accept only cash. For merchants with bS in that range, the prot
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is
(bS) =
(
1
4
(v   c)2 if NSR


v c+bS (m r)
2
2
+ (1  )  v c
2
2
if surcharging allowed
.
It can be shown that 

v c+bS (m r)
2
2
+(1  )  v c
2
2
> 1
4
(v   c)2, because
v c+bS (m r)
2
> v c
2
, bS > bS  m   r. Hence, merchants with bS 2
bS; b
NSR
S

are worse o¤ with the NSR implementation.
Merchants with card use benets in the range

bNSRS ;
bS

accept card pay-
ments regardless of the NSR implementation. Within that range, a merchants
prot is
NSR (bS) = 
 
v   c+   bS   bS
2
+ bS  mNSR
! 
v   c    bS   bS
2
+ rNSR
!
+(1  )
 
v   c+   bS   bS
2
! 
v   c    bS   bS
2
!
if NSR is in place, and
 (bS) = 

v   c+ bS   (m   r)
2
2
+ (1  )

v   c
2
2
if merchant surcharging is allowed. It can be shown that NSR (bS)   (bS)
for bS 2

bNSRS ;
bS

. Using the fact that mNSR + rNSR = bS,
NSR (bS)   (bS) =  1
4
 (1  )  bS   bS2  0.
Hence, merchants with card use benets in the range

bNSRS ;
bS

are worse o¤
with the NSR implementation. 
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